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Dean Fisher's discussion of the regulation of armaments and the
control of force reflects a world order dominated by the Soviet Union
and the United States, a state of affairs which has existed since World
War II. This image is consistent with the view taken by many decisionmakers of the United States and Russia that the world is essentially two
nuclear superpowers around which lesser powers cluster. I am not suggesting, however, that Russian and American statesmen are blind to
what Dean Fisher called the "problem of China" and to that nation's
insistence that worldwide nuclear arms control can be achieved only by
multilateral discussions. Both nations know that China refuses adamantly to accept any plan that would freeze the present nuclear arms
distribution pattern; such a plan would ensure Russian-United States
domination of the world and would naturally meet with China's objection. Indeed, most of the world's great powers have shown no enthusiasm for such a bipartite disposition of ultimate power. And, unless all
portents are misleading, the post-war transcendency of the United
States and the Soviet Union is on the wane. The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and the SALT talks indicate that the United States
and Russia are experiencing a growing fear of nuclear arms competition
from lesser powers. Now the two so-called superpowers are trying to
snuff out nuclear arms competition in the interest of world peace; they
want to break up the game when they have almost all of the chips.
A scheme of nuclear arms control based on the "realities of power"
must reflect and adapt to changes in the world power structure that are
now occurring with unprecedented rapidity. In this connection I do not
completely share Dean Fisher's view. He observed that India, for example, fears that development of nuclear weapons capability is a sine qua
non to great-power status and that if the United States and Russia
accede to China's demand to participate in nuclear power talks, India's
fear will be confirmed. Therefore, according to Dean Fisher, to permit
China to participate in the nuclear arms talks would be a barrier to the
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nonproliferation of weapons and should be avoided. Neither do I reach
Dean Fisher's position that the Chinese should be denied veto power
over arrangements that the United States and the Soviets might work
out in their long-range mutual interest because he believes such a veto
would not be justified by the realities of power.
The realities of power today necessitate the inclusion of China, India,
the European Community, Latin America, and possibly Japan and representatives from Africa, Australia, and other states at a very early
stage. No first-rate nation will voluntarily accept strategic-weapon
thralldom, and the hope for meaningful arms control will remain as
bleak as Dean Fisher pictures it, as long as decision-makers of the
United States and Russia persist in assuming their countries to be as
dominant as they were twenty years ago. That was the best time for
cooperation between the two superpowers-the period between 1945
and 1950. The United States and Russia might then have established a
viable system of world government under their mutual hegemony. For
whatever reasons, good or bad, they chose instead to fight the cold war,
and the blood-bought opportunity for a durable world peace died aborning.
In a nutshell, the SALT talks are too little and too late. They are a
part of the same old game of power politics, being played by antiquarians who have not seen the great light that burst over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. The words of the prophet Jeremiah are of particular relevance:
How long must I see the standard and hear
the sound of the trumpet?
For my people are foolish, they know me not;
They are stupid children, they have no understanding.
They are skilled in doing evil, but how to
do good they know not. Jer. 4:21-22
Of course a start in strategic-arms limitation and control must be
made by someone at sometime. On this all are agreed. I am convinced,
however, that a U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. conspiracy to preserve their world
dominion by means of a monopoly of strategic weapons is not a promising direction for the talks to take; the realities of power will not permit
it. The bomb has made all nations brothers, and all are entitled to play
appropriate, though not necessarily identical, roles in determining the
processes by which strategic arms will be regulated. Only then will the
mutual self-interests of the United States, the Soviets, and the rest of
the world be well served.
Professor Forsythe's paper has marshalled the conflicting claims of
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the Arabs and Israelis and the positions by which these ancient adversaries seek to justify resort to non-nuclear violence. Each party along
with its allies contends righteously that its actual or threatened use of
force is justified as a measure of self-defense or defense of others. In
my estimation, however, the two nations apparently pay little heed to
article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
Professor Forsythe concluded that all law and all restraints on forceful coercion tend to be ignored when threats to a state's existence and
security exist and that law is therefore destined to play a small role in
arms control. In fact, I might add, there is no possibility of world peace
or arms control if each state has an unlimited right to decide for itself
that its action against another state is in "self-defense" or "in defense
of its vital interest." Unregulated and unlimited discretion in each state
to determine when and how it should act in self-defense is the antithesis
of law and legal order.
In any political community each individual member recognizes limitations on its right to defense in exchange for effective guarantees by
the community that its vital interests will be reasonably protected by
public officers. The U.N. Charter in article 51 recognizes the relevance
of analogous restrictions on a member state's right to self-defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
On its face this provision drastically curtails the right of self-defense and
permits its exercise in the event of armed attack only as an interim
measure until the Security Ccuncil has acted. Unfortunately, the cold
war has so polarized the nations of the world that the Security Council
has often been unable to take the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. As a consequence, actions of self-defense,
once begun, are often unduly protracted, and the lengthened conflict is
therefore subject to further complication by the intervention of other
states whose interests originally were affected only incidentally. Also,
the phrase "armed attack" arguably includes immediate threats of force
as well as direct applications, and a threat against a member of a
regional organization may, pursuant to article 52, result in the pro-
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longed involvement of other member states. It is nevertheless encouraging that although article 51, like other peace-keeping provisions of the
U.N. Charter, has not proved to be realiably effective, it signifies an
acknowledgment by more than 125 member states that a state's right
of self-defense is not an unrestricted license to react violently to any
state which contests the former's vital interests. Such a consensus is
tantamount to a rule of international law.
The principle of an unrestricted right of self-defense to justify the
actual and threatened use of force is exemplified by the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the arms race that it has engendered. Another example is
the recent armed skirmishes along the Indian-Pakistani border. One
might also consider the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China poised on their borders, each ready to strike in response to the
slightest movement of the other which threatens the integrity of its
boundary. And the United States is fighting in Vietnam because most
of its citizens, in the decades of the Fifties and Sixties, believed that its
vital interests demanded that the world-wide Red Conspiracy be
checked, by force if necessary, in Vietnam at the 17th parallel.
If the Arab-Israeli conflict is primarily a question of self-defense, it
seems strange to me that Professor Forsythe described the conflict as
"revolutionary." Although this characterization derives from the fact
that the Soviet Union hopes to change the previous status quo that was
favorable to the West, most wars may in that sense be termed revolutionary because they are fought at least in part to change a political
power structure within a region. Since the term "revolutionary" usually
connotes an attempt by a people to achieve a more equitable and viable
political order within established territorial boundaries, there is apparently little in the Arab-Israeli struggle that is revolutionary in the ordinary sense of the word.
The true revolution in the Middle East and elsewhere will come when
states disclaim an unlimited right to use force against their neighbors
in self-defense and choose instead to rely upon the competency and
integrity of the International Court of Justice, the Security Council, or
some other broadly representative and authoritative decision-maker to
enforce their rights. In all candor, however, I would not like to see the
United States make the first disclaimer if its vital interests remain
situated as they are today. But sooner or later the nations of the world
must live by the letter and spirit of articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike must disavow selfdefense by violence if the world is to survive the birth of the atomic age
and live on to enjoy the blessings nuclear power can bring. Until such a
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revolutionary world order has evolved, law will not only be "extremely
marginal in producing formal constitutionalized commitments to arms
control in the Arab-Israeli conflict," as Professor Forsythe concluded;
but indeed, no just and effective arms control whatever will be likely.
The world revolution to which I have referred has possibly begun. The
vast majority of states, comprising nine-tenths of the world's population, are members of the United Nations and pay lip service, at least,
to the Charter's principles. While there may be cause for Professor
Forsythe's pessimism over the role of international law in arms control,
there is also good cause for optimism. The light of world law and order
glows faintly, providing a hope for salvation from the consuming fire
of nuclear war and the pestilence of conventional war. The internationalization of armaments of all kinds may be nearer to realization than
most of us dare to dream.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR CLUTE

Current attempts to define aggression are not unlike the medieval
philosophers' contemplation of the number of angels that can dance on
the head of a pin. Scholars sometimes lose themselves in their efforts
to define aggression while the general population has little difficulty in
recognizing it.
I agree with Dean Fisher on the role of law in arms control. It is
encouraging that treaties on the control of armaments, like those on the
law of outer space, have developed further in recent years than I expected. Success in these areas might be attributed largely to the selfinterest of nations. In this sense the treaty negotiations have served two
significant purposes. They have imposed at least some limitation on
world armaments, and, perhaps equally important, they have given psychological assurance to a panicky world populace.
A very real question here is whether the self-interest that motivates
some developed countries to negotiate these agreements also exists in
the case of Communist China. We must recognize that the major powers
are in various stages of development. The national goals and policies of
countries with a high degree of technological development are in many
ways different from those of mainland China. Therefore, it cannot be
assumed that simply because it is a large power, mainland China will
react to armaments questions in the same way as the Soviet Union.
Communist China's developmental policies are in many respects akin
to those of the Soviet Union between World Wars I and II. The Soviet
Union has now become more developed and less adventuresome,
whereas Communist China is still in the stages of rapid growth and an
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adventuresome, aggressive foreign policy.
Some authorities take the view that a satisfactory method of nuclear
weapons control might result from voluntary abstention, even in the
absence of formal treaties. Their position is based on the belief that
nations simply will not use nuclear weapons because of their horribly
destructive power. The voluntary restriction of the use of poisonous
gases since World War I is an example of how this type of restraint has
proved effective.
In my estimation the greatest problem area now is not the restriction
of a nuclear buildup, but the control of conventional armaments. I am
speaking of not only national armament, but also the supply of arms
by a nation to other governments or discordant groups. Neither formal
legal controls nor informal, voluntary controls seem to have been productive. Some of the most dangerous world situations of our time may
be traced to the supply of conventional arms by foreign powers. One
might consider the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Biafran war, Cuba, Pakistan, and Vietnam. None of these conflicts would have reached their
heights of escalation had it not been for arms supply by the major
powers. Both the Soviet Union and the United States nevertheless continue to ship armaments and military supplies to countries that never
had a military establishment of any consequence before the aid began.
Foreign powers are creating military establishments in Africa and Asia
where they have never before existed, and international conflicts may
likely follow as a direct result.
Continued efforts to arm other nations are not in the best interests
of the world's major powers. Many of the developing nations have been
induced to espouse neutralism or nonalignment to avoid involvement in
the East-West struggle. In addition, the arms supplier often suffers
considerable embarrassment. For instance, the United States has found
itself in the rather dubious position of supplying arms to both India and
Pakistan. In the case of the supply of arms to Cuba, the Soviet Union
discovered itself in an extremely embarrassing position when the missiles had to be withdrawn. This incident certainly did not help SovietCuban relations, just as the Indian-Pakistani affair did little to help
American relations with Pakistan. Communist China's supply of arms
to Africa for use in guerrilla warfare against Portugal and other colonial
powers has likewise backfired. Illegal caches of Chinese arms found in
a number of independent African countries were obviously for use
against the legal regimes of those countries. Some African governments
subsequently stopped the flow of arms and ordered the expulsion of
Chinese diplomats from their countries. Another negative feature of
arms supply is that even after currently intensified conflicts are settled,
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a residue of military power is left behind to encourage violence in future
disputes. Nigeria had a negligible military establishment before the
Biafran war. Now, it is doubtful, however, that the Nigerian military
establishment will ever decline to the level at which it was maintained
before the conflict. A large Nigerian military establishment could
greatly affect future relations between African states.
Where development succeeds in the Third World, social stress and the
possibility of conflict increase. As people become healthier and better
educated, and achieve higher standards of living, they are more inclined
to enter the political process. If the political system does not satisfy their
needs and demands, they may turn to guerilla warfare and revolution.
The developing world is ripe for this sort of conflict, and providing these
peoples with arms is like throwing a match into a tinder box. Even small
conventional armament shipments to a small country with smoldering
social discord could create a situation sufficient to upset the social
system of that country as well as the balance of power in the surrounding region.
I am not as pessimistic about the value of formal commitments for
arms control as some might be. The time is right to make strenuous
efforts to negotiate treaties on both conventional arms and nuclear
weapons. These negotiations must include more than the so-called
major powers, for a number of nations have now achieved the technological capacity to create atomic weapons. The exclusion of these nations, including Communist China, from the bargaining process diminishes considerably the prospects of enduring success.

